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with the coLLapse of the syst€e of fixed exchange rates at the
begj.nnj.ng of 19?3, the lalge oil price ris€s of 19?3 and 1978 and the
glowing strength of the ne$1y ifldustrialiEed countlies, tshe econouies of
the developed countries had to contend with najo! intelnaI and external
iDbalances. Eo! nany, the solution to these ilbaLaaces 1ay in the general
outright floating of currenci€s shich , it nas predicted, xoutd give greater
autonomf' to lational nonetary policies and secure a Dore harnonious patteln
of external paFents.
rhe developnent of the wolId econory ove! the last ten yearE
has not coltfirned the optj.Disn of the suppolters of fr€e floating.
Ecofloric grorth in general hag declined; under-erQloyrent has incleased;
inflationary pressures have continued to pelsist and cullent-account
'ifiibalances have reacheal an unprecedented scaler t'hile the exchange rates of
the najor currencies have been subject to considelable 'ovelshootinq'.
Alfare of the dangerE of, thi6 situation for the developBent of
international trade, the $onetary authorities of most of the irdustriau.sed
cormtsries have endeavoured to restrict exchange late volati.Lity irith
irtervenlj.on They have acted eithe! j.ndividuaLly by tr.r.iag to sta.bilise
th€ir currency's late against the do11ar or against a nbasketn of
currencieg, or by joining together to fortn a regional nonetary union.
This is the solutsior that sone European countriesl adoplecl in
cleatsirg f,irst the "sEake' and tshen the I'European Monetary systenrr. In
nhat way does thj.s solution conbining fLoati.ng and fixed exchange rates
!€present the best response on the part of th€ zone thus forned and j.ts
EeDbe! countlies to extelna1 ard intelnal shocks? lrhat eust be the
econotdc characteristicE of cardidates for a procesE of monetary
integlation? Has this plocess caused national autholities to nake a
fundarGntal adjustnents in the prioritsies tshat they asclibe tso the valious
internal anal external equiliblia? Have the objectives of econonic
stabiliEation that rere sought through exchange rate control been attained?
These are the Dajor theoletical and eryilical questions lais€d by th€
creatsion of a nonetary arraflge[eflt such as the EI!E.
Th€ first part of thi-s note deals rrith the theory of nonetary
irdEgdidl unde! the fou.oirirg two headirgs: the optinun c!j.te!j.a fo!
participation in a iegional nonetary agreenent; the econonic and nonetary
consequences of establishinS a monetary arrangement. The second part,devoted to the ehpirical analysis, sets down i; the first section thestructural characteristics of the menber couttries, economies, which a11or,an a prioEi evaluation of the potential deSree of cohesion within theEuropean tlonetary Systen, and describes, io the section whlch follorrs, thevisible results of the first stage of the nonetary integration processinstitured in 1979.
I.
The theoretical aspects of monetary integration
Itl econonic literature the questioo of rnonetary integration is
approached from tl(,o complementary an81es: the first seeka to iAenti{y tshe
structural economic characteristics that favour a coultryis participationin a regional process of exchange rate stabilisation; the seiond, tiking
the_ viet.] that by the very nature of its objective monetary integrario;
seeks specifically to hodify these structural chatacteristics, is more
concerned with the nature and optimality of the chaEges thus obtalned.
The optimum criteria for membership in a regional monetary arrangement
The introductior of a mechanism of stable exchange rates between
two or more countries is only deEirable - ln terms of both domestic growth
and external equilibrium - to the extent that the candidate countriespossess sufficiently flexible econonic and financial structures. Thls is
the general tenor of this line of thought.
lrundell (1961), the precursor of this approach, considers the
strategic elenent in nonetary integratioD to be the deSree of mobility of
the factors of productioo. The greater this mobility within a giver region,
the smaller the chanSes in relative prices and incomes required to maintain
ful1 emplolmett aod external payneots equilibriun.
This Seneral theory has been criticised for the lack of realismin the hypothesis of Iabour nobility as aE optimum mechaDism for current-
account adjustment. Thls mobility remains very limited in the short term
aod thus cannot alleviate excha[ge rate irflexibility. So, the riSidity of
the labour factor, accompanied by high capital nobility, nay, in a reSional
fixed exchange rate system, trigger cumulaLive depressive chaitr reactions;
an external deficit lrill, itr the absence of aa exchange rate change, in
fact lead to a deflationary policy in the country involved, which \n,i11
generate u[der-employment. This may then be exacerbated by a shift of
capital to the grorth regions of the monetary zone, Iurthernore, one may
questiotr the optimality of such nobility itr the medium term. Clear1y, it
efltails a hiSh social cost which nay lar8ely offset the possible gains to
be expected from Sreater external paynents equilibrium.
Other authors, irhile recogoising that lhe mobility of the
factors of production Day under certain conditions facilltate exteroal
adjustments, take the degree of openness of the economy to be the
fundamental crlterion for monetary inteSration,
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Tower and Wi11et (1976) demonstrate that the advantages for acountry of participating in a monetary unioD increase in proportion to thedegree of the econony's openness, thls being expresseil in ierms of theratio of_ exports or imports to Gllp under condilions of fuIl employment. Thehigher this ratio, the smaller the change in itooestic clemanal require<t to
restore external equilibrium and therefore the 1ess costly res_trictivepolicies in terms of employnent. Moreover, the key influence of the priceof imported goods on domestic prices should make iountries with very open
economies prefer adjustolents iII domestic demald to changes in exchanle
rates. The conclusion of this atralysis is that it is in the interests of
small economies, which are by their nature hi8hIy open, to join toSether in
monetary unions.
other authors advance a similar line of argument. llcKinnol(1963) states that the degree of opermeEs i"rithin Ehe union musts De greaterthan that existiflg between the union and the rest of the eorld.z fle also
adopts a more directly relevant definition of the deSree of openness, whichis measured by the ratio of tradable to no[-tradable goods. In addition,
I{cKinnon stresses the fact that in countries where this ratio is high, real
incomes are strongly affecled by exchanSe rate fluctuatiols, causing
economic agents to index their incomes to changes itr itrDort prices and thus
reducinS ttq-' effectiveness of the exchanSe rate as an iDstrunent of
adi us tment. -
orcutt (1955) puts forrard another argrlrlent for countries with
hiShly open economies fonning a mooetary union; irl these small countries
imports are generally composed of products $ith low substitutabitity with
goods produced domestically. So a depreciation of the national currency may
have a perverse destabilisinS effect on the trade balance, riith the rise in
the prices of inported goods substatrtially exceedinS the fall io their
volune.
The proposition that a highly open ecorony is a crite!:ion for
monetary integration is based on the hypothesis that all causes of
disequilibria ir the economy are of domestic origin. this hypothesis was
perfectly appropriate in the 1950s and 1960s lehetr the theory lras devised;
nowadays this is no longer the case. The works by Ketretr (1969), Giersch(1970) and Corden (19i2) have demonstrated that diametrically opposite
conclusions can be reached lrheo the disturbaaces are of external oriSin.
Ior Kenen, for exanple, the extent to which the economy is diversified is
the determinitrS criterior. The Sreater this dive rs ification, the more the
economy is capable of absorbinS external shocks luithout a change in the
exchange rate. It is therefore to the advantage of hi8h1y diversified
ecooomies to enter irato mo[etary atratrSenents to stabilise exchange rates.
Clear1y, this theory is precisely the opposite of the proposition argued by
l{cKinnon. The nps! diversified economies are in fact the lar8est and thus
rhe least open.a
Recognising that the exchange rate has the quality of a monetary
and firlancial variable, other authors have stressed the importa[ce of the
extent to which the financial markets of the candidates for a monetary
union are inteSrated. Thus, according Lo Ingra$ (1973), iu these couotries
perfect capital slrbstitutability will alIo$ automatic balance-of-payments
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adjustnenL at a Io\rer cost than r,ouId be involveal in arl exchange rate
change. The main criticism levelled at this theory is that, faced kith alasting domestic imbalance, a country cannot go on torrorring indefinitely;it I.JiII eventually have to adjust in real teims. It is noi certain that
such a delayed real adjustment lrould be Iess costly than that which souldhave resulted from an iftnediate depreciation of the ixchange rate.
The extent to which rrages are price-indexed is the second
monelary fdcLor to trhich a key 16le in the viabiliLv of a,nonetarv union js
atLribuLed. Countries which dijler siBnitican!ly in rhis respeci usua))yhave different inflation rates. Under rhese condltions, maint;inin8 srabie
exchange rates is flot an optimun solution in terms of grorrth. ]n eifect, a
country wilh high inflation would be forced to reduce ihe increase in itsdomestic pri-ces jn order to stay in the union aIId \rould have to accept a
worseninS of. unde r- enp loynent . This is the line of argument advanced byCorden (1972) and Tower and t,,i1lett (1976). It is, howiver, based on thl
assunption of a Phillips curve, i.e. a possible trade-off betueen inflation
and unde r-employnent. However, both the recent experiences ofrrslagflationrr atrd the neo-monetarist approach of rationlt expecLations
tend to suSgest the existence of a natural unemplo)'nent ratE $hich moretarypolicy is powerless to inlluence oo a IasLing basis.' In these
circunstances differences iII inflation rates and degrees of wage
indexation do not constitute, a priori, a fuDdamental obstacle to the
formation of a monetary union.
Iloirever, if \rages are fully price-indexed, Uarstpn (1982)
demonstrates that production is affected by real or moneLary" domestlc
shocks in exactly the sane l,ay \rhether exchange rates are floating or fixed
within a mgneLary union. lrhere indexation is not complete it is the origin
and nature' of the economic disturbances that must deternine the choice
bet\reen the two r6gimes.
A study oI the optimum criteria for monetary inteSration put
forward in economie literature does not produce any clear-cut theoreLical
conclusions lrhich could serve as a practical guide, for four main reasofis:
(a) it is urtikely that the countries wishing to join together in a
monetary union vi11 possess a11 the optimum characteristics of a
good candidate;
(b) unions based on such criteria lrould usually be short_1ived,
forming and dissolving according to ehether Lhe ecotromic
disturbances were real or monetary, or of external or donestic
oriSill;
(c) the aim of nooetary inteSration is precisely to modify the
structural characteristics of member econonies in a direction
that e i I I he I p to preserve Lhe un ion i
(d) finally, the abmpt dividing line between floating and monetary
union \./ith immutably stable exchaflBe rates does not conform to
reality.
-84-
It might therefore seen more meaningful to examine the
cotrsequences whlch can be expected a priori for the cafldidates for a
monetary union individually aod coIlectively.
The econoBic and monetary colsequences of establishing a nopetary artangement
The first and principal consequence oI forming a motretary unionis the loss of autonomy in national nonetary policies. l,laintaining exchange
rate stability implies that the member countries will set similar moEetary
8routh tarSets. The rate of growth can ooty be that chosen by the domitrana
econony, whose currency will tend to become the rese.rve insLrument for the
system (tike the doltar in the BretLon l,/oods system).o
In fact, only this coufltry will retain control of its monetarypolicy. Under such an arrangement, monetary policy conver8ence beLween the
menber countries is only possible, and the maintenance of stable exchange
rates ooly lastin8, if two cooditions are met:
(a) perfect capital substitutabiliLy within the unior - no exchange
conlrols - which will retrder policies of neutralisitrS the
itrflueDce of reserve movements on monetary growth ineffective;
(b) a 1ow deSiee of rvage indexation - allowinS price ftexibitity - so
that i[ooetary policy can modify inflationary expectatiolls
quickly and at lov cosL.
If these colditions are not fulfilled member countries will
probably be uaable, or unwilling, to relinquish autonomy itr national
policies. There will be only liDited coivergetrce of nonetary Srowth rates,
impairitrg the credibitiLy of exchanSe rate stability *hich in turr riill
result in recurring exchange-market crises and the liShteninS of exchanSe
controls. The basic aim of the honetary arranSement, nanely a lower leve1
of exchanSe rate volatility than there would have bee[ under a r68ide of
outright floating, [right not then be achieved.
If, hovever, the condition of perfect capital mobility is
fu1filled, the loss of monetary policy autoDoEy is absolute. In the presetrt
econo ic envirorueflt, the ecoaomic cost of abandoning this preroSative
will nevertheless be smal1, itrsofar as its idpact on Lhe real dome5tic and
external imbalances would tend, accorditrS to the mooetatists, - to
dimitrish: itr the first case - domestic imbalaoce - as we have seen, because
the Phillips curves are almost vertical; in the secotrd case _ external
inbalatrce - because rrith floating exchange rates [onitra1 exchange rate
chanSes have less and less effect on real exchanSe rates so that a couEtry
caEnot Eain a la:#in8 conpetitive advantage from a cofltinuinS depreciation6i i ts .urrencv-
tt tt" 
"orrotay with the unionis resetve curreocy practises amonetary policy cotrducive to a lold rate of inflation, o4e may therefote
expect i geaeral fa1l in and conver8ence of ioflation rates ia member
co-untries, $ithout any sigtrificant worseoitrS of uoder_enploymetrt in the
zone.
-85-
. 
In terms of economic poticy, the fornation of a monetary unioohas a second inpqltant consequence: iL resLores the effecLiveness ofbudSetary policy." Once Dember governmeoLs have stoppeal usiflg the
motretary itrsLrurnetrt,.there is a great risk of intensive 1.r_se of bud'getarypolrcy geared to natiooal objectives, particularly io those coutrtries in\rhich- the adjustment to a r68ime of lolr illflation rates entails a highsocial cost. Thls may create external disequilibria beti,/een member
countries on such a scale as to eadanger the survival of the monetary
uoion. Maintaining the union therefore implies a certaitr cleSree of
harmotrisation of budgetary pollcles.
The authorities of member couDlries will only accept a reductionof autonomy in natiotral economic policy if they cart expect ia return a
trumber of positive results from inteSration in terms;f alomestic and
external equilibria.
ln this respect, the funda$enta1 purpose of etrtering iato a
resional exchaoSe rate arraogement is to eliminate the adverse
repercussiotrs of real and nomioal exchange rate volatility on external
equilibrla, The last decade has shoc,n that under a floatiog r6gine there is
sometimes considerable real exchatrSe rate overshggting furthered by atr
excessive nobility of short-term capital fIovs." BalaDce-of-paymeats
disequilibria are then exacerbated rather than alleviated as anticipated
by the supporters of flexibility.
Ilo$evet, excbaDge rate etabilisation can only eliminate these
drawbacks to the extent tbat the candidates for the union have fairly
similar ecoEomiq and social structures, especially in the case of a partial
moneLary union-- in vhich exchange rates can fluctuate lrithin certaiD
marSiDs and parities may be revised (as in lhe case of the European
Monetsary System).
If, on the other hand, ecooomic structures vary too greatly,
exchanSe rate stabilisation may have negative repercussions on both the
current and capital-account balances. The conpetitiveness of the higher-
inflation countries si11 deteriorate, exacerbatio8 their trade
disequilibrium and LriggeriBs periodic speculative pressules which will
have a further adverse impact on their paymetrts equilibriun. As a short-
term response, theEe corutties !Ii1l dralr heavily on theil exchatrge reserves
and inLroduce exchaoSe controls, which rri11 reduce their fitrancial
itrteSration in the utrion. ExchanSe rate stability can thus be compromised
by the facL that, notwithstatrding developnents within the zoner capital
flows - from couDtries outside the utriod _ $i11 tend to gravitate towards
the least segmelted markets -
In the longer tern, if these countries are not able to reduce
their inflation rates Lo the sane 1evel as that of the domioant economy,
they r^,i11 have a choice bettreen two policies:
(a) a more or less frequent revision of their parities, in which case
ooe of the decisive ecoBo[ric advantages of the ulion !,i11 teEd to
be lost. However, if Lhese patity chanSes reduce the real
exchanSe rate overshootinS characleristic of outright f1oatio8,
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the external disequilibria lriLhin the uaion will rerhai[ smal1
and the utrion will therefole have a better chBnce of survival;(b) a deflationary policy which miSht spread throuSh the uDion ovinSto lov labour mobility accoDpaDied by a high degree ofiBtegration of the goods and capital narkets I The "teailencytoeards uniforn q,age level$ that lri1l probably energe within ahe
union, reSardless of productivity differeoies, m-ay further
agSravate the situation. Ilowever, it is not impossible that the
coEcentratiofi of capital in the host productive regions, while
causing 1ar8e pockets of regioEal uDemploytreDt, mat eventually
raise productivity in the motretary zone as a \rhole.
It therefore appears that the nain econooic cousequences of
eDterin8 itrto a monetary arraogenent - unless iL is a fuII moneiary uaion -sil1, a priori, be positive if the member countries set similar priorities
atld possess similar econonic and social structures. If tbis i; not the
case, the consequences si11 be negative, especially if the authoritiesdelay revisiDg inappropriate parity 8rids.
If parities are revised frequently, atr examinatiotr of the
economiesr structural parameters is not sufficietrt for a diagnosis. Atr
eepirical aDalysis of the results of nonetary integration is alsoqecessary.
IB the secoDd part of this Dote the experience of the Europeatr
llonetary System is examined otr this basis.
II.
The empirical aspects of the creation of a regiopal motretary
alrartgement: the example of tbe European llonetary Systen
The main objective of the Europeao Monetary Systeml4 established
itr March 1979 is to stabilise exchan8e rates betweeo the member coutrtries
of t'he European EcotroDic Comunity.
There are four chief reaso[s ilrhy this arraagemetrt is oEty apartial nouetary ujrionr
(a) the exchaaSe rates may flucLuate eiLhltr a certaitr band, which
varies itr size depetrdiBS on Lhe couDtry concerned;
the parity Srid nay be revised by nutual aSreemeDt;(b)
(c) the creatiotr of a European l{oaetary fuDd,
defitritive issue and codtrol of ECU8, has
later date;
(d) froe the outset the United KiDgdom opted out
mechanism.
re6poE6ible for the
beeE deferred to a
of the exchange rate
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I'urthermore, the EMS has existed itr aa especially uDpropilious
period for its survival. The external disequilibria of the EEC countries$ere a8Sravated by the substatrtial tise ln oil prices itr late 1978, the
getreralised sloninS-dowD of world grorrth aod, lastly, lhe abrupt rise and
nouotiag volatility of the dollar exchange and itrterest rates, partly
attrlbutable to the tree US moEetary policy introduced in October 1979.
Despite this utrpronising start, the European Motretary System has
held its owD, at the coEt of a Eumber of exchange rate adjustments atrd
thanks to the greater co-ordination of moletary atrd exchange rate policies.It is {orth examininS the r61e played in this process by the structural
characteristics of motretary integratiotr (see Sectioa I above) aod theiaitial lesults of this Dotretary arrangemetrt.
Examination of the optimum cliteria for Eotretary inteSration for the
EMS countries
1- The existence amonS the EltS coutrtrie6, which are all xoembers of
the European Ecotromic Co@rurity, of the principte of the free Dovemelt of
factors of production is, accorditrg to Mundell's criterioE, a point
conducive to the establiBhDeat of a motretary uniotr. Ilowever, the trunerous
cultural aad social differetrces still subsistitrg withiD this group are a
Dajor barriei to labour niSratiotr. the most obvious maDifestatioo of this
itradequate flexibil-ity is the continuinS existetrce of si8nifica4t
differences ia regional uoeinployheEt aEd wage raLes.
Indlrect - aDd very limited - evldence of the impact of laboui
oove&euts oE extertral adjustmetrts hay be supplied by the development of
workersr renittaDces as recorded itr the balaoce of paymetrts. Table 1belor
shows the relative cotrtribution of such renittances to extertral equilibriun
in 1975 and 1981.
Table 1
IET BAIAIICES OT TRADE AND OI WOBXERS t BET{ITTANCES
EXPRESSXD AS A PERCENTAGE OI I}IPORTS
* Line 77 aed in IFS
not include dilect
sarce: IFS (IuF).
entirled iprivate
trarlsfers of rrages
unlequited tlansfers" (this itefl does
by eL?loyers fo! their eDployees).
1976 1981
BalaEce Balatrce
Belgiuo ,..
Italy .....
Netherlards
Irelatrd .. .
- 6.2
- 24.1
- 7.8
19.5
- 10.4
3.6
- 
15.4
0,6
0.4
2.4
4.O
1.4
0.9s
2.6
- 11.2
- 5,6
10.5
- 15.2
7.2
- 27 -8
0.6
0.8
2.O
1,9
1.2
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These figures pronpL the folloring remarks:
(a) A subslantial portion of these renittances comes ftoo workers
r4,hose countries of origin ate outside the EEC aod rrhose novementshave been affected by the restrictions on immigration introducedby some countries. Thus, it is likely that." but for these
resLrictions, the modest redu.tion in the size oI the incometransfers observed in the German and lrench balances would not
have occur!ed.
(b) Subject to thls reservatiotr, it would seem that the apparent
impact of labour mobility on balance-of-paynents equili_b-riun in
Lhe EIIS countries is negligible colpared with EhaL of movements
of goods. This phenomenon is all the oore remarkable in that
unemplo],nent rates almost doubled in some El{S countries between
1975 and 1981.
. It appears, therefore, that as far as the criterion of mobility
of factors of production is concerned the EHS does not, a priori,
coflstitute an optinum monetary zone.
2, However, the large degree of integratioo anongst the econoniesparticipati[8 to the ElrS provides a counterbalance to the iosufficieot
mobility of the labour. As Table 2 below sholrs, the degree of openness of
the nember countries vis-i-vis the world ecoflomy and \dithin the EtlS jFparticularly high in comparison with that of the U;ited States or Japan.l)
Table 2
DEGRBE 0r oPENMSS: EXPoRT 0F G00DS AND SERVICES
AS A PERCENTACE OE GROSS DO},IESTIC PRODI]CT
Coufltry
(1)
To EMS
(2)
To the r:est
of the rrorld
(3)
10 the world
as a \rhole(+2)
BelgiuD ..,...,..
Denmark .........
I'rance,....,,,..
GerBaIIy ..,......
Italy ......,....
Netherlands ..,..
Ireland . . . . . . . . .
Japan .,.........
United states ...
37 .8
12.1
9.7
34.1
17,3
2-5
21.9
21 .4
.6
13.0
18.9
36,5
13.6
7.6
59.7
21 .1
28.9
53.1
53.8
15
10
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ADother measure of the sensitivity of exlernal eauiliblium to
changes in tratio[al iocome cao be provided by the incone j"Jicity ofimport denatrd. The higher this elasticity, thi greater will be the impactof changes in domestic demand on the balance of tiade.
Iable 3
EIAST]CITY OI IIIPORT DX}'AND IN REI.ATION TO GROSS DOUESTIC PRODUCT
1
2
npparent elasricities2
1.43
3.37
1.54 1.27
1.16
1.88
1.98
1.57
Es!i@tion period 1962-73.
Eslieation period 1975-80.
These data must be considered with the rrsual reservatiols,particularly ifl the case of the estimates for the period 1975-80. Subject
to these reservatio[s, it appears from Table 3 that these elasticities are,
on the \,/ho1e, considerably greater thaD unity. lloreover, they have Lendedto iflcrease during the rece[t period. This nakes policies designed to
restrict domestic demand a vital regulatory factor in deter[dning external
equilibrlum, siace the re-equilibratiog influence of exchange rate chaoges
tends to dimioish tith the disappearance of noney illusion phenomena both
trationally atrd intertrationally.
A large degree of openness vis-er-vis the outside vr'or1d aod a hiSh
degree of iocome elasticity of imports thus nake the countries of the
Europea[ Monetary System a suitable group for forDin8 a monetary union.
3. tihilst there is a fairly large degree of iotegratiotr on the
market for goods io the EMS, this is not the case on the financial sarkets,
r.,hich are segne[ted, to a varyitrg degree at different periods, by national
reSulations o(I capital movemetrts. 0n1y the Gefiian financial market is
larSely opetr to the outside world.
This also sigtrifies that the sensitivity of XMS couotriesr
balatrces of paymeots - and hence the speculative pressures on their
excbaoge rates - to chaoges i[ interesl rates itr coutrtries oulside the zone
can be substantially different. The finditrgs of simulatiotrs made with the
mullinatiooal lair (1981) ,lode1 measurinS the impact of a one per cent.
chanSe itr the dollar iiterest rate sustaiaid for six quarters (see Table 4)
testify to the existence of such differences.
-90-
Table 4
SE}ISITIVITY OE TIIE E},IS COUNTRIES I BALANCES OF PAYIIENTS AND
EXCHANGE'MTES TO A OM PER CENT. INCREASE IN Tl{E SI{ORT-TERI' DOI,LAR
INTEREST nATE SUSTAIMD FOR SIX QUARIIRS
CouDtry
Changes in the
exchange ratel(in percentages)
Chenges irl the bala'lce
of paymencs as a,
percentage of cDP-
BelgiuE ...
DeDnark ...
Irance ....
GerEany ...
Italy .....
Ne!herlands
Ireland 
- - -
3.7
2.3
4.5
3.4
0.1
0.06
0.00s
0.3
0.o7
0.33
s ]"gn
s ign
1A
2A
positive
po s it ive
corresponds to a depreciation in the exchange rate.
corresponds ro an inflow of capiral.
The lidited financial iotegration of the EllS couotries may
therefore encourage speculative turbulence likely to jeopardise exchange
rate stability within the nofletary uDion. Similarly, this inadequatefitraflclal iotegration is an obstacle to the convergence of monetarypolicies, \a,hich can only be assured by a perfect substitutability of
capital.
4. Neither are the existing differeoces in the degree of indexation
of wage rate* $ithin Lhe EMS, a priori, a factor cooducive to monetary
iDLeSration.'" The degree of indexatiotr cao be measured directly by setting
up a model of noninal !ea8e rates adjusted to take account of the expected
developnent of itrflation rates and the level of employmetrt. The data in
Table 5 beloe, takeo from irorks by Resnick (1976) and Sachs (1979) using
this approach, provide atr evaluation of the degree of indexation in the
naitr EI,S countries. The fact that the comnoo estimates differ quite
substatrtially suSgests that the fiaditrgs should be vie$ed with caution,
Table 5
EIASTICITY OT TI{E WAGE RATE IN RE],ATION TO TIIE EXPECTED INIIAIION RATE
slchs (1979) 1
Prsnick (1975)z 0.15
1.35
0.83
0.88
0.63
0.85
4.75 1.65
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. _Two relatively clear points energe, horever, oamely, that thedegree of vage indexatioo in cermany is lower than in the oiher ,lS
corrltries and that, tenerally speaking, the degree of \rage indexatioo inEurope is relatively high.
These characteristics of the El{S cou[tries give all the more
cause for concetn abouL the success of the process of ninetary itrtegrationin that the impact of nomitral wage increases- on eDployDent tends fo be both
Sreater and nore disparate itr a situation of fixed exihange rates thalr iII aperiod of outr,iSht floating, as is su8Ses\qd by work 'carried out byDeardorff et. al. (1977) (see Tab1e 6 below). "
Table 6
II,IPACT ON IOTAI, EMPI,OYI'ENT OI A ONE PER Cf,NT INCREASE IN NOI'INAL
I'AGES I]NDER A II)GD OR ILEXIBIE EXCIIANGE RATE SYSTE}T*
(changes io employment in percentages)
Country Fixed exchangerate
I'lexible excharlge
rate
Be1giurn...
Deflmark ..,
Fraace ,...
Germany ...
Italy . ....
Netherlands
Irelaod ...
1.54
r .65
1.75
r.58
1.94
- 1.27
- 1.24
- 
A ,)X
* Resutrts of simulations using a world model of production and
trade coveting the 18 principal industrialised countries and
disti.nguishing between 29 sectors. See Deardorff et a1. (1977).
It may be noted that, lrith fixed exchatrSe raLes, the impact on
employnent of ao inclease in nominal wages is particularly Sreat \dhere the
economy concerned is small and thus 1ar8e1y open. Thls is because only wage
increases in large countries caD itrduce a siSnificatrt iEcrease iD worldprices \dhich goes some lray towards restoritrS those countries!
conpetitiveness and partly offseLs the iaitial adverse impacL of the 9?a8e
increase on employnetrt.
\{ith flexible exchatrge rates, holrever, disparities linked to
country size are sharply attenuated and there is a sigtrificant reductioo itr
the setrsitivity of emplolneot to increases in waSe rates.
0f the four strucLural characteristics shich play a key r61e in
the optimality of a monetary union, only ooe appears, from arl examination
of historical data, to be lelatively favourable to the establishnent of the
Eus (disregarding ihe reaction of ihe ecooomy to external shocks): this is
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the degree of openness to the outside \,/orlal. Ilol,rever, one should not dwell
on. the ne8ative aspect of insufficieot fi[ancial integralion ana the
:lisLenc.e oI subsLantia.l disparities oiLh retard to vage l-ndexaLion, for irIs pernlssrble to ho-Id that, thalks to its orn mohentur, the EllS hasal.ready exercised and rrill ilr futule exercise increasing pressure towarals8reater convergence of moneLary policies 1ike1y to inirease financiallntegrallon and assure control over nominal developments irithirl the groupof EllS countries.
The beginning of this process is exanineal in the last sectionbelo$.
Results of the first staee of the monetary integration process rdithinth-;EropeanEoneiarvSys-aelr
In the face of the disarray of the itrternational monetary system.the founders of the European Monetary System souSht to attain three main
objectives through the stabilisation of ixchange r-ates, namely:
- to re-establish sustai[ed grovrth, enabling a gradual return to be
made to fu1l employoent itr a stable noletary ;oviroruleot;
- to reduce regional disequillbria lrithin the European Comnunity;
- to create a stabilising pole in international ecoromic and
mofletary relations.
Two approaches are possible in order to evaluate the result ofthis first step towards monetary integration. The first consists in using
econometrics to estimate and simulate a nultinational model for the period
1973-82: this lrou1d nake it possibte to identify the chan8es brought about
by the creation of the EHS in the behaviour functiotrs of private and public
economj.c agents, to measure the specific effects of reducing exchaoSe aate
volatility and to assess the durability of the impact of this stabilisatiotr
on the long-term development of the exchange rates concerfied. A second
method cotrsists in studying economic and mo[etary trends, in terms of
Srowth atrd variability, io the EI,S countries sioce 1973 in comparisoa \rith
those recorded in the industrialised coutrtries as a whole and in measuring
hov the 1979 morletary arrantement has affected their relative positioo irl
this geDeral context aDd within the E S itself.
lor reasons of sinplicity and time, we have adopted the second
approach ia this section, althou8h it is not always possible to distinguish
bet$eetl the specific effects of the stabilisation of exchatrge rates and thei[pact of the other ecotromic policy measures accompaDying this
stabilisation.
The outcome of the efforts made by the llls cou[tries to achieve
sonetary integration are examioed in shat follows under thlee headings:
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measurement of the reduction in Lhe
real exchange rates;
apparent corlsequences as regards
equilibria;
variability of Dominal and
external and inleratal
- impact on the conduct of monetary atrd budgetary policies.
Ileasurement of the red[ction in the variability of exchange rates
There is no doubt that the cotrcertation machinery adopted in
connection q,ith the 1979 monetary arrangement has enabled the day-to-day
variability of exchaDse rates to be reduced. Ho$ever, taking a longer-term
view, the effectiveness of this machitrery seems more uncertain in LhaL thepermitted bilaLeral tlq:tuation margins remain relatively vide (j6 per
cent. for: the lira and :2.25 per ceat. for the other currencies) arld the
member countries have taken advantage of the possibility of adjusting their
central rates on six occasions.
IE order to as6ess the reduction in exchange raLe variability itis first necessary to define the coocept. The most appropriat.e \iray of
measurirlS exchanSe rate variability would be to isolate the chatrges which
were trot anticipated by economic ageits, i.e. the "surprises", to use thejargotr of the "new macro-econonics r' , for only these can have an impact onthe real economy. This, of course, calls for a nodel describin8rlhe
formatiot! of agentsr expectations. In the absence of such a modef,'" lre
have adopted iII this note aa approach based on the average excharlge rate
growth calculated for different time-spiEs (1. 2, .... 12 months). For any
giveo time-span, the staDdard deviation-' of the groriith rates provides a
aeasure of the variability around this average rate. By thus elininatiog a
trend effect, ehich, it may be thought, is taken into account by the
market, the preceding criticisro catr to some extent be avoided.
The problen then arises oI definiEs the excha[8e rate, oDe
soluLion \a,ould coosist iII simply takinS the bilateral exchange rates
expressed in oDe of the EllS currencies. This has the nerit of providing the
authorities with a variability yardstick which can be i[terpreted directly
in market terms. However, this approach is stil1 ioconplete, since it makes
no allowance for the behaviour of ecoflomic agents, $hose operatiotrs aad
asaets are widely diversified ifltertrationally. The attitude of these
agents with regard to exchatrSe rate variability is better assessed with the
aid of an effective exchatrge rate index. In order to cornbitre the advantaSes
of both approaches, i{e have used in this note ao effective exchange raLe
coocepL - see Appendix III^_ from which the bilateral exchanSe rate i[dices
can bi derived directty.'" Two sorts of effective exchange rate itrdices
have beeo compiled (Tab1e 7 below). The first is limiLed to the EUS
currencies and enables the stabilisatiotr effect to be assessed at the leve1
of the Europeaa Sroup as a whole. The second takes accoult in its
composition ot ttre tact that the EtlS zone is largely open to the rest of the
world and is therefo!e lnfluenced by the floating of currencies outside the
zone; this effective index has been compiled from lrhe currencies of the
eighteen pritlcipal industrialised couotries.
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Table 7
AWMGE }IONTHIY GROI{IH RATES OF THX NOUINAL AND RNAL EIFECTIIE
EXCHANGE RATES OF THE EI'IS COIINTRIES)!
(expressed as annual gro\rLh rates in percentages)
18-counEry reithtinss 7 EMS-country weightings
1975 L/1979 \\ 1979 11/19A2 a7 19?5 tl1979 La 1919 Ia/ 19A2 rA
ReaI Real
Belgium , . .
lEe1y .....
lrela.d .. .
5-26
1 .20
- 2.7 6
6.85
- 
t 0.31
5. 10
- 4.27
- 3.30
- 3,60
1.10
- 
2-60
3.83
- 3.42
- 
0.06
- 6.88
- 7.19
- 5.35
- 
2.13
- 7,18
2.64
- 
4_05
10.30
6.54
2.53
6.39
0.08
6.09
1.13
- 4.26
- 4.11
5.30
-1I .61
3.s8
- 5.66
- 2.29
- 2,49
s.00
- 1.94
0.49
- 2.58
- 3.314
- 4,97
2.38
- 3.19
1.85
0.36
5.ll
- 2.31
1.36
- 4.63
1 .08
- 7.93
0. t5 - 1.10 - 5.20 4.61 - 1.30 - 0.07 - 0.78 - 0.85
6.24 2,80 2.30 4.O1 6, 15 2.81
* An increase in nominal exchange rares correspoads to an appleciaEion of rhe
domestic currency and hence Eo a loss of conletitiveness, all orhe! rhj.ngs
being equa1, An increase in real exchange rares corresponds ro an ioplovementin competitiveness.
llaving thus defined the framework foi analysing exchange rate
variabitity, it remains to determine the period of floating over which the
siabilising effect of the establishment of the EMS is to be assessed- Since
the German, Belgian, Danish and Dutch currencies were always meDbers of the
"snake", it 
"o,rld seem appropriate to take the years 1976 to 1978, theperiod in which the other three El{S curreocies sere all f1oatin8.
The statistical findings of a comparison of the Srowth rates and
variability of the EI{s currenciear exchange rates over the periods 1975-78
and 1979-82 as set out in Table 7 suggest the fol1owitr8 coflunents:
(a) The EHS has reduced the variability of the effective exchan8e
rate of the participatinS currencies among themselves ' llowever,
by alld 1ar8e_ this sirarp ieduction has occurred for time-spans of
tess than 6 to 9 months. Beyond this, variability has tended to
approximate that of the period of fIoatsin8. DurinS the latterpiiioa, i" fact, variabitity ceased to increase beyond the tenth
irooth.' Moreover, the stabilisirg effect is _ as one miSht
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expect - rnore signifi€ant in the case of the French franc, the
Italiao J+ra and lhe Irish pound than for the ex-members of the
''snake".-' As reSards the average rates oI appreciaLion or
depreciation, it may be noted that the trends observed during the
period of floating have on the whole contiaued in the EI{S, albeit
with a clearly reduced intensity.
(b) 0n the other hand, when one considers the variability of the ElrS
currencies in relation to that of the currencies of Lhe eighteen
major induslrialised countries - Table 7 _ it cafl be seen that
there has been nuch greater instability in the recent period than
during the period of floating. The reason for this must be sought
irl the appreciation of the do1lar and the turbulence to which it
was subject froln the third quatter of 1979 onwatds in connection,principally, rdith the introduction of the neld US monetarypolicy. 0n1y the Danish currency constitutes an exception to the
geflera1 patter[ in that its variability is snaller vis-]-vis the
eighteen currencies than vis-:r-vis its EMS partners for time_
spans of over one week.
I'rom a {ulther examination of the statisiics in Table 7 it
emerges that, despite an external enviro lent which eTas unfavourable for
currency stability, the 1979 rDonetary arrangement enabled the linter and
lntia-groups" varlability of the EMs currencies to be reduced -
appreciably - ir the short term (less than one year) atrd petmitted all the
previous up$ard or do\rDwaLd trends to be moderated.
This reduction of the instability of trominal exchanSe rate
provides a direct, but ooly pattial, indication of the effectlveness of the
EtlS. In fact, exchanSe rate chanSes olr1y have atr impact on the real ecooony
to the extent that they are not neutralised by price novemeflts in the
opposite direction. In order to take account of these effects, a real
excha[ge rate lndex sholrld be used, that is to say, an exchange rate index
whose oovements are corrected to take accouflt of those of relative prices.
These real exchallgJe rates have been calculated using the same
procedures and definitions" as were used for Lhe nominel rstes and
'employing consumet price ioalices for the relaLive prices.zr The averaSe
monthly groeth rates for Lhese real effective rates are showtr in Table 7
atong with those which were conputed for the nominal effective rates. As
can be seen clearly frorn the fiSures, lrhilsL the establishment of the El'lS
has indeed resulted itr a sigtrificant reduction in the "inter-8roup"
variability of nominal exchange rates, thete has been no simila! movement
in real rates - atrd this is true r,ihichever effective exchange rate index is
employed. A graphical representaLion of the aeal ef{ectlve rates for the
periods 1976-8 ar.d 7979-82 (Graphs 1 to 4) given overleaf confirms thispoint. Itr fact, it may be seen that since the establlshment of the EMS the
deformation of real exchanSe rates has been more protracted atrd more
pronoutrced than during the preceding period of floatin8. lloreover, the
competitiveoess of Lhe non-rrsnakerr members, which irrproved s118ht1y during
the period of f1oatin8, has tended to undergo a narked and sustained
deterioration since 1979.
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It appears , therefore, that the stabilisation of [omina]exchan8e rates has made for the emergence of more systematic anal moreprotracted deviations of real exchanSe rates ifl lhe gUd count.ies arra nenceof Lhese counLries' respecLive competitiveness. ffr,i" r"y__fr"r.-"ft..t.aLheir exlernal and internal economic equilibrj 
". 
' "-" "
W "r th" Exs," ,"s.
^- ..^ -_"t!: ,iEpact of these systetnatic aleviations of real exchange rateson Ene trns hember countries, economies is borne out by an examination ofthe evolution of the terns of trade in 
"of,-" t"rr" .".i. tfr" ,".i.i tSZg_St(see Table 8).
EVOLUTIO}I
Table 8
TER}IS OF TRADE, COIIPETIIIVENESS AND DOI,IESTIC GROfiTH
ET,IS COI]NTRIES OITR TI{E PERIOD 1979-81
(in percentages)
Index of coDpeliriveness calculated on lhe basis of consuEer prlces, using the
oethodology desclibed ln Aaoex trr,
lodex of coopetitiveness calcutered oa lhe basis of vaae cosrs per unit produceitin @nufacturins industlv; source: rls (ftr).
OF THE
OT TI{E
Rare of Bro,ch^i! Differ.orial of CDP
grouth in relatio.
to.haE of thq
oECD counL!i€s-
(6)
(1) (2) (3) 
=(1 
-2) (st2
?.6
6.7
5.1
5,1
1.5
3.4
5,6
1.1
- 2.O
2.5
1.6
3.6
1.5
4.7
3.2
- 0,1
4.5
2,O
10.3
6.5
2.5
6.0
- 3.4
6,0
- 0.1
- 1.7
6.1
- 0.3
- 0.8
4.4
1.2
4,2
3 soulce: OECD ecoaoric 6ut1ddn.
Doubtless the groq,th differentials between domestic denand andforeiSn demand (see column 6, Tabte 8) are partly responsible for thisdevelopmelt, particularly in the case of the Netherlaods and Denmark, \rherethe decline in inport volurne - generally fairly insensitlve to price
effects in small countries - seems to be coDnected with the substantialdecline of domestic denand. Io the case of the other count.ries, on the
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oLher.hand. the changes in Lhe Lerms ot Lrade in volume rerrns appear Lo be
:learly I inked. ro changes in comper.iriveness. fn. ."*"qr.r."l oi this
:::.11o.".]o_n. rn reat _exchanSe raLes seem to be parricutariy substanlrat in
:l::-::=" "r. rE 4y and rrance, t here rhe insuf{icient conpeliriveness oi rhe
:i?:L"_...."' may have tastin8ly jeopardised investlment and made iLorrrlcutr !o restore competitiveness over time. Thus there is a risk, here,of perverse chain reacrions which can 
"r1y b. ;;;;,i;;-;y-i,J." a..qu"n.adjustments of the EUS central rates or by a najo*uairJi"i ,n tfr"domestic inflatiort rate.
, ,As far as internal equilibria are concerned, it is probable thatrnrs relative deLerioration of competitiveness has adversetv atlectedemploynenL in france, Italy and Irela;d.
These unfavourable consequences of the stabilisation of exchangerates l,ithin the EMS have not, hovever. prevenLed Lhese countries as awnole iron attaining equivalenL 1eveIs of gro\dth to those recordeal in themain industsrialised counlries, r,,hich had n;t been the .u"" i"-it" 
"u.fi",perrod ot tloatinS exchange rates. This can be seer fron the statistics onthe development of gross domestic product in Iable 9 be1oe. Similarly, thepace of inflaLion has been moderated more in the EIIS countries than in Lhe
oECD as a ehole (see Table 9). It \rou1d be rash to attribute these relative
successes to Lhe 1979 moneLary arraogement. Indeed, it is likelv Lhat the
rea.l Iocations of resources broushl aboul by the deviations of reai exchangerates \rithin the monetary union have, for the time being, only had alamited impact. It should, however, be emphasised that the;;tablistunent ofthe EHS has not been a handicap to the ecolomic developnent oI the [onetary
area as a $ho1e - far from it.
I4p!c! of Lhe.e!tablishmeot of Lhe XIS on the conduct of mo4etary analbudgetary po I icies
The founders of the EUS itrtended that it should introiluce greaterdiscipline into the conduct of the budgetary arld mo[etary policies of the
mernber coutrtries, whose stalce in the past had beea paril_cu1arly lax inthis sphere. It was not eovisaged that the low-inflatio[ countries shoulalintervene indefinitely on the exchange narket to support the weak
curreflcies, thus subordinating their monetary objectives to those of the
countties v,/ith the highest inflation rates. On the contrary, it was
expressly provided that the strotg-currency countries might maintain theirdomestic monetary objectives atrd that the necessary exchatge rate
adjustnents eould be made.
This is in fact hoi,/ the XllS has operated: the nonetaly impact of
exchanSe-market intervention has been largely sterilised - as j result of
the_ imperfect substitutability of capital - and thus has not prevented the
oember countries from pursuins monetary policies Seared t; domesticobjectives, as rritness the development of money supply and interest rates
over the period 1975-78 as compared with 1978-81 (see Table 10 below).
Ho\^,€ver, some elements of convergence t.olrards stricter monetary policies
can be observed, which te[ds to show that the intended disciplinary effectis beginning to materialise. In fact, the 4 per cerL. slowdoen in Lhegrowth of 11 for the XMS count.ries as a Sroup is much larger than would be
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inplied by nechanical application or rhe cDp 8ro\rLh rate and inFratron raLelrenda set.out-in Table 9; on that basis, ilr."."ar 
",- 
i 
"r' 
#l"Ld'i", 
" 
r"." 0.5per ceot. A difference of this nior:ovations ;;i;;;;;; ;; il: 1,",'l,i:i,'i :i#:;.::ji".J:Tir"ff":,.:,i;:,,,
:l::: h"" in. this respeci been a rundarnental :;;;;;-i;;" ilnio"l,",, ., ,n"moaetary aulhorities. DrornDred ny tr," ,oruni*-Ji?..ili] iill;*.r* ,.the dispersion of rates oinonetary growth ancl of trominal interest ratesatrd the oore co-orditrated development of expected real interest rates _ ofh,hich Table 10 provides an approxinare p;..r;;'-' 
";p;T... ti,r""..r"."n."" ", "r.
--,.- 
Ia appears., therefore. that budgeLary policy sLill remajDs theonry rnstrumen! vhich is totallvRecinr trends 
",";;;;8';,';ff:'i,:i::'ij:,:::':iirr:i;i"l:,,,:::::::;i:;of budget deficits by means of reduciDg Lhe importance of programmes oIsocra-[ traosfers and increased taxation.
DEVEIOPI{ENT OI GROSS
COI'NTRIES
Table 9
DO.}IESTIC ?RODUCT AND CO}ISINIER PRICXS IN THE EIISAND IN TI{E OECD COII}ITRIES AS A I'HOLNT!
(average annual growth rate)
ConsLrner price index
1975 /78 1978 /81 1915 /7I 1978 /71
Bel giun
Denmark
France
Germany
Ita1y...........
Netherlands
3.2
3.4
4.0
3.8
3.5
5.2
1-2
1.8
1.8
2.6
0.3
1.9
6-9
10.0
9.4
3.6
15.3
6.4
13. o
6-2
11 .2
12 .4
5 -2
17.9
5.8
17 .3
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Table I0
DEIELOPMNT-oF THE }JoItEY sUPPLy (M,) AND oF REAL ANDNOIIINAL INTERNST MTES IN THXZEI,'S COL,NTRIIS
avela8e annuaL rat. Dsy-.o-dey itrteresi
rate (annEl ave!:ge)
1979/81 1976/78 1919/A1
9.5X
9.1
13. 1
22.1
13.8
18.9
s.57.
10,3
11.1
1,5
r 3.9
8.3
6.3
8.5
3.a
13.7
5.8
9.0
14.2
12.0
8.8
16.2
10.0
- 0.5:
+ 3.1
- 0.8
- 0.6
- 3.t
+ 3.az
+ 1.2
- 0.3
12.7
9.2
8.1
5.4
8.6 12.3
Conclusion
In the first part of this note it was sho&rn that the countriesparticipating in the Europeatr Monetary System onty satisfy one of thetheoretical criteria that clearly favour mooetary integraiion, viz. thelarge degree of openness of their ecotromies; and;ven th-is is not relevantin the presence of aI1 external shock. Despite this theoretical hanalicap andthe e,x-is-tence of a particula!1y difficuft external economic environmetrt,the 1979 monetary a!ran8ement has succeeiled in stabilisios nomitral
exchaaSe rates to a significatrt deSree and in encouraging the first moves
totdards a Eeasure of co-ordination of monetary policieJ. O; the other hand,the stabilisat.ion of excha[8e rates has undoubtedly been accompanied by alastiaS declitre itr the competitiveness of some member countri'es and histhus had a depressive effect on their economies. Ilowever, the relativedeflationary inpact that some authorities lrere atrticipating at the outsetfor the mooetary urlion as a ,ho1e has not yet nateriali;ed.
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Appendix I
Exch counlries particioat inq inteos adoDted
and the EMS after the abandonnent of the Brerton Woods
Country
Exchange rate system
Fixed exchange iates Float ing exchange rates
EMS EMS
Belgiun-LuxeDbourg
Dennark
France
GerEany
Italy
Netherlands
United Kin8don
Ire lard
SlIeden
Nort,Iay
24 -O4.72
31.12.18
01.o5.72
to
23.06.12
10.10.72
to
31.12.78
24.O4 
-72
19.01-74
10.o7.75
15.03,76
24.04.72
31.12.78
24.04.72
13.O2.73
24.O4.72
to
31.12.?8
01.05.72
23.06.72
o1.o5 
-72
to
23.06.12
r 9.03. 73
29 .08.11
23.05.72
!o
31.12.77
13,03.79
r 3.03. 7 9
13.O3 .79
13 
-O3.79
since
13.03.79
since
't3.03-79
13.03-79
24.46.72
09 
-10 -12
20-o1 .7 L
09.07.75
16.O3.76
01.03-79
14 .O2 .7 3
to
0r.03.79
24.06.'t2
24.06 .72
o1 .o3 -12
30 
-oa -17
ot 
-01- 78
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Appendix II
The main technical properties of the European
l,ronetary System
The nain properties of the Europeanin llarch 1979 by the nine member countries
ComnuniLy, are the Iol lor.,in8:
llonetary System, established
of the European Econonic
Creation of the ECll and exchange rate arrangements
The Etlropean Currency Uflit, the ECU, is defined as a',basket,,of
currencies composed of constant amounts of member countries' clrrrencies,\tiz i
0.828 Deutsche t{ark
1. t5 French francs
0.286 Dutch guilder
0.14 luxembourg fralc
0.00759 Irish pound
0.0885 pound srerlinS
109.00 Ttaliafl lire
3.66 BeIBian frarcs
0.217 lanish krone
The value of the ECU in terms of any currency is obtained by
addinS together the equivaleots of these amounts in that currency. Each
cou[try defines its.curreicy's parity in terlts of Lhe ECU and utrdertakes tohold its bilateral rates within a margin of : Z.Z5 p", cent. from bitateral
central rates. It should, howevgr, be noLed that Italy is authorised to
observe a ftuctuatioo nargin of : 6 per cenr. and that rhe United Kirgdon
does rot participate in the exchaflge rate mechanism.
Intervertion and support mechanisms
The aliver8ence intlicator is the main innovation of the European
l{onetary System. A dlvergence threshold is set at 75 per cent. of the
maxinun auLhorised divergence spread in relaLion to a currency's ECUparity. Tf a currency crosses this threshold there ls a presruption that
the parent authorities i{i1l irritiate corrective monetaty and econonir
exchange rate policies. Interventions on the foreign .xching. mu.k6t" ur"
made in member countriesr currelcies, which can be acquired aSaiost go1d,
dol1ars, SDRS or ECUS. ECUS are created on a temporary basis against the
transfer of 20 per cent. of member count.riesr gold alld dollar reserves Eo
the Europear Motretary Co-operatlon Iund (EllCF). These ECUS are used to
settle the short-term debts arising from financin8 under the unlimited
short-term (45-day) credi! facilities that member countries Brant each
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other. The interest rate on these facilities is equal to the weiShtedavera8e of trational discount retes. The existence iiifr.-fd.i"i" no, y"tdefiaitive, as the Eltc! has not beer-,"p1.-J';; iiu ''r-u."oi"u"'J roo"ar.yFund, the inteoded issuiDs and controllinS body. ' --- --'-r""
In additioa. tbe cxisrinS reciprocal crediL arrangemenLs beLlreenthe.EEC countries ri,ere expaoded, oakinS Ecu 25 billion available ror lhree-Donth credi ts, rene!,ab1e Lwice, and t"i r"air__i"ir-ii"-r;-.;;:'='
-105-
Appendix III
Ihe theoretical framer{,ork used to construct these indices isbased on the foll oving bypotheses:
(a) The.world is coEposed of ,'n,' countries and each country producesa rrco{posite,, exchangeable comdodity, the price 6f'this
comnodity being expressed in donestic curr"ncy. _(b) The consu$er divides his expenaliture among comnoilities of the
exposed and sheltered sectors in accordioce with utilityfunctioos with the characteristics of group iDdependence asdefined by Iheil (1980). This hypothesis peimits ihe utilityfuaction of the commodities exchanged to be treatedindeperdently.
(c) The analysis assufies that all the coflnodities excha[8eil may bedefitred as "specific substitutes,i io accordance lrith Theil'sinte4)retation (1980). This hypothesis is tantanount to assuEitrSthat the col4)oslte colmodities are for the moEt part industriatgoods. It is irdeed probable that raw materials ind industrial
Soods are more in the natlrre of ,specific coEplementary goods,,.
(d) Alt consumers are rational aod their denand funcLion paraneters
are stable; they have the sane syste& of preferences.
Iurthermore, the i4col[e elasticity of the demand for goods is
equal to unity for all agents. In this way it is possible to
aSSregate the behaviour of cooauners and to cofisider thee as a
siEgle a8etrt eho divides his expenditure among the ,icoEposite,,
constraint:
P.H.=:+ a. , j=r,...n
Irl
(1)
where I{- is the total anount of world ex}orts expressed itr curreocy i, q.is the iotume of Soods exported by coLrntiy j at ihe price p. 
"*p."'"""a iicurrerlqy j, and 1.. is the bilateral exchanSe rate betveen ttrb curreocies i
and 
-i_". It is fdrther assu.med that the world consutrer divides his
expeaditure betweeo the "II" composite conmodities so as to maximise apreference functioo Vr (11., Pr.) expressEd as a functiotr oI prices and
income or as aD ind-ireit uttliLy'function'" in the form:
n P':i
v.(H., Pr7.) 
- i rJ ,ich O<c.<1vr:A -l (2)I r' r - l,l. ) ) j)
Pw. 
.rl
P,9.1
1J
(3)
P.
=_r1..1l
i
i+iwithPw..=P,
a1
atable
(4)
-,06-
:l:I: _(_1)- "11,(o)- define. respecLively, rhe pr.ice or comnodiry j and a{rorld prlce index for exported goods expressed in currency j,
1, 1ltlt."* the Roy _theorem (1942) to e4Iarion (2) ir is poss.ibteEo oDEarn a consistent set of denand equaLions./ for Lhe,.nr.conpositecohnodities- The demand equation for co-nmodity i iq,l iu.ir"a l.o, tt"indirect utitity Iunction thus becomes: - '-i' --_ ''-'
av. av.
'r aPw-. aM.11 1
In the present case the
(s)
will be equal
(6)
(o.-l)
I 11
(RoY identity)
two terDs of this equation
t.
Ps- - ul'1Jr
ftr.
2
11
av.
aPlr. .11
av.
nj
I
1 0i
__; ll P!,,: (7)
aM.
By combining (5), (5) and (7) it is possible to obtain the atetrland
equation for conunodity i in which, in accordance with hypotheEis (d),itrcone elasticity is equal to unity.
(4.- I ) 0. M.
a- = a. h,.l n pu.l 
=f- $irh ra:=I-a. (8)
" l " 
tui - l-l
ltr tf1
_ 
Note, here, that this equarion is a simplified form of theclassic export demand function. lt coEprises, i; fact., a variabletepresentinS the voluroe of world demaud (ll./pn.), a price itrdex for the
exported commod i ty (Pw-.) uiLh negative elasticity ( oi - 1) and an
a8greSated price index'for compeLios comodities (fipv ?j) with positiveel asLicity. j 'J
J+i.
The market share of each coDf,roditv can be obtained bv
subsLitutios q. in equation (l) by its expression in equatioo (8):J
pu. 
.0 
-rr'i
"i = -l:-="iI
Ihis result si8[ifies that two particularly
io the irdirect utility function (2):
(1) The substitution elasticity of each commodity is equal ro irs
market share in $ortd trade-
(e)
strong hypotheses are itrcllrded
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(ii) The system of dematrd eqxations, thus deflned, assumes stabilityof market shares in value terms.
OB the basis of this theoretical frame$ork it is possible todefire a cotrsisteot set of inalices of norniDal aod real eftective uxcnrngerate6. To do this it is sufficiFnt to divide th" t;;;;;;;;i'e 
.quation(8) by the quantiry l.l. thus 8ivin8:
;. p_11
4j
Pu. 
_ virh1l
Equation (10) sholrs rhat the market share iDsimply depe[ds on price indices, exchange ..t""-."aelasticities betrreetr the various composite- comnodities.defitres the real effective exchEote: aoSe rate concept (pppr)
d. M.
d._1
PPP. = pw.l
1-d. ( ro)
vol.rme t"rms25
substitution
This equation
adopted ir this
(fi). Pw.:
Pw. 
.
t o. =
.ll
Pe.: ' n
I
i+i
Pw.
_l
P.I
fljj+i
o,
Pv-']1l
oi, be_ilrg coEstaat, can be ignored i[ the analysis; the market share isnormally equal to O. pv.
-M.
_ 
Equation (11) shows that the real effective exchatrqe rate of a8ivetr couotry is equat Lo tbe ratio of an ioatex of 
"orla fricL: coveriogall countries, including the country codcerned - to the price index of thatcouatry.
To obtaiB the nominal effective exchaEse rate itrilex it issufficienr to rewrite (11) using (3) aad (4) as fol1-or{s:
PPP. P (t2)
where Q. is precisely the nominal elfective exchange rate anil F aindex of world prices not deftated by exchange rate -variations:
I rij
I r9i .p.J1lj+i.
!,i th
weighted
(13)
1..P.11
o.lr 1.1j'rj+i
fl p.J
.ll
I 0. =jlj+i
, o. - 1
JJ
P ui th
I -c[.
(r4)
-108-
is trrofolalhe interest of rhe effecrive exchanSe rate ifldices (ppp. and Q.)
- 
:l:I-:.:.,l.".flered direcrry irl terms of rhe developmenr of rhemalRet share of the country concerned;
- they are also direcLly consistenl ,ittr ft. bilaterrl exchan8erate indices (ppp... 1..).IJ 1l
This latLer point can be illustrated as foltows:
- l:l- .PPIi and ppp. be the real effective exchange rates orcounLrres r and j,"and ppp.. their bilaLeral index, so that:1J
P.
_l
"'ij - l-EIJ1
KnowinS that the relationship of indices ppp. and ppp_ is:1-l
PPP. P. 1_ll
'i 1-
definition (13) makes
i (o. +a. )
'i = 1..' I
1.l
PPP.
-____!PPP.l
it possible to lrrite:
, 0, (o.+o. )
. [ 'ik " - 1..' Jklr l; 1l
k+i J K
klj
(1s)
(16)
( 1-d. -o. )
11 1l(7)
PPP.
J
Application of this result to equation (16) shows that the bilateral
exchaa8e rate is equal to the ratio of the effective exchaEge rates:
P.l
lt r
(t8)
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Iootnotes
A?pendix t contains a review of the exchanSe rate r68imes adopted by
the major European countries since the system of fixed parities was
abandoned.
Marston (1982) formatised this analysis in a general model describing
a process of moretary union in a three-coultry wor1d. fle demonsLrates
that the inportant factor is rot only the degree of openness of the
economy in Seneral but also the extent of trade betvreen the candidatesfor monetary integration.
l/e should note that }lcKinnon does not take account in his analysis of
the \dealth effects caused by exchange rate changes. These effects play
a ceotral 16le in the modern theory of exchange rate determinatiol.
In the present context of a hi8h1y unstable international economy,
countries such as Belgium, Denfiark or the Netherlards nou1d, on this
criterion, be advised to opt for free floaLin8 of their currencles.
Paradoxically, this has 1ed some monetarists IParkin, (1972) I to
advocate, under certain circunsLances, the formation of monetary
unions.
Tt should be noted that in the case of donestic monetary shocks
Marston confirms the classical findilgs of the llundell mode1,
i.e. that monetary policy cao only influence the real econony when
there is perfect er(chanSe rate flexibitity. llarston demonstrates that
this advantage of flexibllity vanishes i,,hen vrage levets are fu1ly
indexed: then, the exchange rate fa1l tri8gered by nonetary expansion
is offset, through fu11 indexation, by a symrnetrical rise in domestjc
prices which leaves the terns of trade unchanged. The expansionary
effect oD domestic producLion of an increase in exports cannot
therefore occur.
These findings corresPond to the corclusions reached by Turlovsky(1976), who demotrstrates that for countries n'ith highly open
."ooo.i." exchanSe rate stability is preferable to flexibility when
the money narket is nore uncertaitr than the export goods market'
Unless, of course' a colnmon currency is creaLed ia'hich is issued and
controlled by the union's central bank.
It should be noted that tbis neo-mo[etarisL proposition of the grol,Jing
ineffectiveness of mooetary policy, regardless of the exchanSe- rate
r6gime, runs counter to tle iheory elaborated by FIeminS (19621. atrd
u;d.11 (1968), which attribuLes to it a kev r6re in a period of
floating.
This neo-monetarist theory is far from being proved ia the case of a
reserve currency such as the do1lar.
10
11
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Fleming (1962) has denonstrated that the effectiveness of Keynesian
expansiooary policy is o41y Proved under a fixed exchange rate r68ide.
tlith floatinS exchange rates the expansionary effect of the bud8et
deficit is offset by tshe depressive impact of the curtent_account
deflcit. The latter results from the Srowth in domestic demand iBduced
by bud8etary expansion and from the appreciatioa of the exchanSe rate
caused by the rise in interest rates due to the increase in the public
sector's demand for capital.
In this connection, see Ireokel and Rodriguez (1982).
13 This question does not arise io the case of futl monetary union, with
reserves pooled and exchaoge rates immutably fixed.
Appendix II sets out the main techtrical properties of the system.
It should be botoe in mind that the criterion of a 1ar8e degree of
opemess as a factor favourinS monetary idtegration has only been
verified in the presence of internal economic shocks.
16 Unless one adopts the neo-monetarist argument of the porlerlessness of
noDetary policy under both fiscal and flexible exchatrge rate syatems'
17 The effects on employmeDt of an increase iD nominal wages sould
probabty be considerably less in the recent period oving to the
disappearance of noney i I ILrsion.
12
74
15
18 OwioS to the inefficiency of the exchan8e market and/or the existeEce
of a risk premium, the forward exchange rate i6 trot a Sood predictor
of the fuiure exchange rate. This being so, deLelnination of
"surprlses" depearts on-the assutrptions nade by the maker of the model
."g"idios the _n ture of Lhe iEformatio[ used by speculators to fotm
their expectaLioIIs.
Utiti6atiotr of stantlard deviation as the indicator of dispersion is
not above criticism, for the underlying assullption that the
distributioD of exchange rate variations is Gaussian is aot
trecessarily proved - see solnik (1978) on this Point'
Ihe bilateral exchange rate iEdex of tlro countries is equal to the
.riio oe tl"it effective exchaoge rate indices The variability of the
tii"t"."f exchange tale is equil to the sum of the variabilities of
the effective ."'chang. ratui minu6 tvice their co-variaflces By
"iit.".f their constructioo, these 
effective exchanSe iate indices
evolve in tine lrith export market shares itr volume term6 The
coastrucLion of the \,rei;hting system for Lhe effective exchange rates
i" t"".a oo the assuflption that export market shares iD va1ue. terms
ui"-""""t""t. AppeDdix lII describ_es the theoretical construction of
these iodices.
19
20
2L The co-variances of the effective indices conp[led from the effective
alrd bilateral rates bear out lhis observation'
22
23
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Note Lhat the real effecLive exchange rate iodices are preseoted as
represeDtative of the evolutiotr of export narket shate6 in volu$e
terlDa - see Appendix III. Thus, an itrcrease in the index de[otes a
gain in cofipetitivenes s .
This decisioo $as made with a vieli to preserviDg nonthly indices,
\rhich ruled out the constructiotr of a telative cost index per uflit
prodBced, which miSht have been nore relevaEt.
IE the case of lrance, expotters have souSht to hold otrto narket
shares by cuttitrg their export srargiDs a d increasing their margins on
the domesLic Barket, which Soes sone way to explaitr the sharP grolrth
otr the ifiport side.
25 1ii is the price of a utrit of curreEcy i expressed iD uDits of
cutrency J.
26 As GornaD (1976) deoonEtrates, dematrd functiotrs can be derived more
easily oa the basis of indirect tather Lhaa direct ulility function3.
27 This system iE cotrsisteDt itr that it has the charactetistics of
perfeci aSSreSation: that is to say, resolvitrS the system of "trr'
iquations -is i function of prices and income gives a vector of tbe
qriaatities perfectly coDsistant oith the budSet constraiot (1) '
- 112 -
References
Corden, W.U. (1972). "Ionetary inlegratior.ri
Iinance, no. 93, Princeton: Princeton Universily
Dearalorff, V.A., Stern, M.R., and Green, N.M. (1977). "The sensitivity of
industriai output and enployment to exchange rate chan8es " In Trade anq
P:vmpnts Arliusiment undJr Flexible Exchanse Rates (eds. D J I'larLin and
A ce oI the lnlernatrondt
Econornics Study Group. )
Fair, C.R. (1981). "Estinated olrtput, price
rate linkages amonS countries. r' National
Essavs in lnternational
, interest rate, and exchange
Brreau of Economic Research
q9!L!.Eg_EgtSI, no. 577.
Fleming, J.Il. (i962). "Domestic financial policies under-fixed and under
Iloatiii exchange rates." 1E-9!gg-B3l9Ig, vo1. 9, pp' 369-380'
Frenkel, J. and Rodri8uez, c. (1982). "Exchange rate dynamics and the over-
shooting hypothesis.'r IM! Staff Papers, vo1. 29, pp 1-30'
Giersch, 11. (1970). "Entrepreneurial risk under flexible exchanSe r:ates 'r
in Appilaches to Greater ilexibilitv ot f.{ctrange. Bat-es I the Burgenstock
Pjpg!qGa:-E-;1r-t;T' in*i.n : P r ince too unive r s i tv P re s s
Press.
Ingram, J.C. (1973). I'The case for European nonetaly i.Itegration." !35gyg
, Princeton: Princeton University Press'irl lnternational Finance no. 98
Kenen, P.B. (1969). "The theory of optimum currency areas: an-eclectic
"i"r-i i. i"J.." p."tl.r" "l 
(ed6 R' Mutrdell
and I(. Svob-o-f,iJl-tfrIiago : universitv of Chicago Press'
}lcKinnon, R.I. (1963). rroptimun currency areas'" American Economic Reviei'r
vo1. 53, pp. 717-25.
Marston, R. (1982). "ExchaoSe rate uniofls have an alternative to flexible
;;:;;;;: -;.i;;.; ln Exch;sg Rates in rheorY and Practice (eds'
J.I.O. Bilson and R.C. l'larston).
tjundeI1, R.A. (i951). "A theory of optimum currency areas'rr American
Economi c Revieu, vol. 5I . pp . 657-65
|lunde1l, R. A. (1968) International Economics, New York: llacmillan'
orcutt. G.H. (1955). "Exchange rate ailjustment and the relative size of the;:;;:;i";i;; iioili'n""i"" oi s.o"',i'i ""a st"ti"ti'", vol' 37' pp' 1-11'
Parkin, M. (1972). "AD overflhelming case for European mo[etary union'"
Banker, vol. 122, PP. ll39-42 '
Economic
- 113 -
Resnick, A.S. (1976). "A macro-mode1 for \{estern Europe", in Eg:9t939
Economic Integration (ed. B. Balassa). Amsterdam: [orth ]Iol1and.
Roy, R. (1942). De lrutilit6. Paris: IlermanD.
Sachs, J.D. (1979). "Wages, profits and macro-ecooonic adjusuDent: a
comparative study.i Brookings Paper on Economic Activitv, 2' pp. 269'33?.
samuelBoo, L. (1973).
0ccasional Studies.
I'A ne$ model of lrorld trade.ri oECD Eco[ohic outsIook -
solnik, B. (1978). "I'influence du Systlme lroD6taire loternati-ona1 sur le
coEporiene.rt des taux de chaD8e." Centre drEnseigBement SuD6rieur des
&!lgggg, ro. 101.
Theit, H. (1980). The Svstem-eide Approach to Micro-econonics, Chicago:
Utriversity of ChicaSo Press.
Tolrer, E. and Wi1lett, D.T. (1976). "The theory of oPtinlum currency areas
and eichaoge rate flexibitity: a nore SeDeial franework." Special Papers itr
Internatio;al Economics, no' 11, PriBceton: Princetotr Uoiverslty'
Turtrovsky, J.S. (1975). "The relative stability of alternative exchanSe
rute syst.rns itr the preseflce of randoo disturbatrces." Journal of ]IoneY,
Credit atrd Bankiog, vol. 8' p?. 29-50.
